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Unconditional security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol has been proved by exploit-
ing the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, but the practical quantum key distribution system
maybe hacked by considering the imperfect state preparation and measurement respectively. Until
now, different attacking schemes have been proposed by utilizing imperfect devices, but the general
security analysis model against all of the practical attacking schemes has not been proposed. Here,
we demonstrate that the general practical attacking schemes can be divided into the Trojan horse
attack, strong randomness attack and weak randomness attack respectively. We prove security of
BB84 protocol under randomness attacking models, and these results can be applied to guarantee
the security of the practical quantum key distribution system.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is the art of sharing secret keys between two remote parties Alice and Bob,
unconditional security of which is based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. The detailed security
analysis has been proved by applying the entanglement distillation and purification (EDP) technology [2, 3] and
the von Neumann entropy theory [4–6] respectively. However, unconditional security of the QKD protocol has an
important assumption, which requires Alice and Bob have random numbers to control the classical bit encoding
and measurement bases selection, and it can be easily proved that security of the final key can’t be guaranteed if
input random numbers are controlled or known by the eavesdropper Eve. In recent years, practical QKD system
was attacked by considering the imperfect state preparation and measurement respectively [7]. More generally, the
practical attacking scheme can be divided into three different types. The first type is considering the Trojan horse
attack [8], where the signal state combining with the trojan horse state can be assumed to be high dimensional state
modulation. Note that Eve can measure one dimension of the modulated high dimensional state to get all of the secret
key information without being discovered, thus Alice and Bob should apply the dimension filter (such as wavelength
filter) to avoid this attack.
The second type is the strong randomness attack, which considers some of the input random numbers are totally
controlled by the eavesdropper Eve. Such as the multi photon state can be attacked by applying the photon number
splitting (PNS) attack [9, 10], where the multi photon encoding quantum states can be assumed to be known by Eve.
Another example is the detector blinding attack [11, 12], where Eve can easily mount the man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack by converting the avalanche photodiodes (APDs) into linear mode. The detectors have the count iff Bob’s
bases selection is equal to Eve, which means that the bases selection in Bob’s side are controlled by Eve. Recently
we propose the probabilistic blinding attack model [13], where Eve partly applies the blinding attack to avoid being
catched by detecting the current parameter. In the strong randomness attack model, the final secret key rate should
delete all of the counting events known by Eve. The GLLP [14] secret key rate and the decoy state method [15–17]
can be assumed to delete all of the multi photon pulse counting result, and only the single photon counting event
can generate the final secret key. While the probabilistic blinding attack can be assumed to delete all of the blinding
counting results, and only the non-blinding counting event can generate the final secret key. In the strong randomness
attack model, the previous secret key rate [18] formula can be modified to
R ≥ pS(a|E)− fh(e), (1)
where p is the probability of valid counting result, which can’t be controlled by Eve. a is Alice’s measurement
outcomes, E is Eve’s auxiliary quantum system, S(a|E) = S(a,E) − S(E) is the conditional von Neumann entropy,
which demonstrates Eve’s uncertainty about Alice’s key bit a. e is the practical bit error rate, h(e) = −elog2e− (1−
e)log2(1− e) is the classical Shannon entropy function, f ≥ 1 is the error correction efficiency. If we consider the PNS
attack, p can be illustrated by the single photon counting rate, S(a|E) can be estimated by the single photon error
rate.
The third type is the weak randomness attack, which considers input random numbers are partly controlled by Eve
[19]. Such as the wavelength dependence about the beam splitter will introduce the wavelength attack [20], where
Eve can apply different wavelengths to control Bob’s bases selection. Since the practical beam splitter and different
wavelengths may only have partial correlation, which means the beam splitter coupling ratio can’t reach 0 and 1
with two different bases, thus Eve can only partly control bases selection. Another example is the time shift attack
2[21], where Eve controls the APDs detection efficiency by controlling the photon arriving time, thus Eve has the
advantage to guess the measurement outcomes. Since the practical time shift attack will introduce nonzero error rate,
the classical bit encoding can be assumed to be partly known by Eve correspondingly.
Now, the Trojan horse attack can be avoided by applying the dimension filter before the state modulation and
measurement, which can be used to prevent Eve’s Trojan horse light. The strong randomness attacking model has
also been analyzed by applying the strict post processing, where we only need to precisely estimate p and S(a|E).
However, the weak randomness attacking model has not been analyzed until now. In this work, we prove security of
the practical QKD system with weak input random numbers, which can affect the classical bit encoding and bases
selection respectively. We give two security analysis models, the first is based on one post processing step, where
all of the measurement outcomes should be applied one time error correction and privacy amplification. While the
second is considering two post processing steps, where the measurement outcomes in two bases should be applied
post processing respectively. If we only consider bit encoding weak randomness, two different methods can get the
same secret key rate. But, if we consider the bases selection weak randomness, the analysis result show that two
post processing steps can generate much more secret key. Our analysis models can be applied in several attacking
schemes, such as the wavelength attack and the time shift attack. Combining with the previous three attacking
models, security of the practical QKD system can be evaluated completely. Thus, our analysis result can be applied
to estimate security of the practical QKD system, which can be employed to build the practical QKD system security
standardization.
BB84 QKD protocol with weak randomness - In the BB84 protocol, there are two binary input bits x1 and x0
in Alice’s side, which can be used to select the state preparation bases and encoding classical bits respectively. While
the state measurement side Bob needs one binary input bit y to select the measurement basis. After the quantum
state preparation and measurement, Alice and Bob should apply the bases sifting process to save the same bases case
(x1 = y). Thus, in the security analysis model, the input randomness can be divided into two sets, the first set can
be used to decide the encoding classical bit selection x0, while the second set can be used to decide the encoding and
decoding bases selection x1 (or y). Since Alice and Bob should publicly compare x1 and y to save the same value, we
can only consider Eve has partial knowledge about the bases selection x1 before the state measurement, the security
analysis model can be simplified correspondingly. Thus we can only assume weak random numbers x0 and x1 to
control the encoding classical bit and bases selection respectively, the detailed analysis model is given in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: Weak randomness QKD model, where x0 decides the encoding classical bit, x1 decides the encoding bases selection, y
decides the measurement bases selection. In the weak randomness QKD model, Eve has the advantage to guess the classical
bit encoding x0 and the basis selection x1.
In the weak randomness model, the weak random numbers x0 and x1 can be controlled by two different sets of
hidden variables λ0 and λ1 as the following equations,
p(x0) =
∑
i pλ0=ip(x0|λ0 = i),
p(x1) =
∑
j pλ1=jp(x1|λ1 = j), (2)
where λ0 and λ1 are hidden variables controlled by Eve, p(x0 = 0) is the probability that Alice encodes classical
bit 0, while p(x0 = 1) = 1 − p(x0 = 0) is the probability that Alice encodes classical bit 1. Similarly, p(x1 = 0)
is the probability that Alice applies the rectilinear encoding basis, p(x1 = 1) = 1 − p(x1 = 0) is the probability
that Alice applies the diagonal encoding basis. Note that two sets of hidden variables λ0 and λ1 should satisfy
3∑
i pλ0=i =
∑
j pλ1=j = 1. However, even if the practical experimental realization can observe p(x0) =
1
2
and
p(x1) =
1
2
respectively, we still can’t guarantee p(x0|λ0 = i) = p(x1|λ1 = j) = 1
2
for arbitrary hidden variables λ0 = i
and λ1 = j. Thus, the the aforementioned security analysis model based on perfect random input numbers can’t be
satisfied directly, we need to estimate the randomness deviation for arbitrary hidden variables. The practical weak
randomness model is given by
|p(x0|λ0 = i)− 1
2
| ≤ ε0,
|p(x1|λ1 = j)− 1
2
| ≤ ε1,
(3)
where 0 ≤ ε0, ε1 ≤ 1
2
, ε0 = 0 (ε1 = 0) is the perfect random number case, which means that Eve has no prior
knowledge about the classical bit selection (bases selection). While ε0 =
1
2
(ε1 =
1
2
) means Eve previously knows the
classical bit selection (bases selection), in which case Alice and Bob can’t generate any secret key even if they can
observe p(x0) =
1
2
(p(x1) =
1
2
).
One-step post processing method - By considering the given hidden variable λ0 = i, we apply the EDP
technology to illustrate the practical state preparation as the following equation,
|ϕ〉λ0=i =
√
p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i)|00〉+
√
p(x0 = 1|λ0 = i)|11〉, (4)
where Alice encoding the classical bit 0 with probability p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i), and encoding the classical bit 1 with
probability p(x0 = 1|λ0 = i) = 1− p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i). By considering the given hidden variable λ1 = j, Alice prepares
the quantum state in the rectilinear basis with probability p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j), and prepares the quantum state in the
diagonal basis with probability p(x1 = 1|λ1 = j) = 1 − p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j), thus the final quantum state preparation
under the Pauli quantum channel is
ρABij =
∑
u,v qu,v
{
p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j)I ⊗XuZv|ϕ〉〈ϕ|λ0=iZvXu ⊗ I+
p(x1 = 1|λ1 = j)I ⊗HXuZvH |ϕ〉〈ϕ|λ0=iHZvXuH ⊗ I
}
,
(5)
where u, v ∈ {0, 1}, H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
is the Hadmard matrix,
∑
u,v qu,v = 1, q0,0 is the probability that Eve applies
identity operation I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, q0,1 is the probability that Eve applies phase error operation Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, q1,0 is
the probability that Eve applies bit error operation X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, q1,1 is the probability that Eve applies bit phase
error operation XZ. Since Alice’s state preparation is restricted in the two dimensional Hilbert space, we can prove
the final secret key rate under the Pauli quantum channel. Thus, the quantum bit error rate and phase error rate
introduced by Eve can be respectively given by
e
i,j
bit = 〈φ2|ρABij |φ2〉+ 〈φ4|ρABij |φ4〉,
e
i,j
phase = 〈φ3|ρABij |φ3〉+ 〈φ4|ρABij |φ4〉,
(6)
where
|φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉),
|φ2〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉),
|φ3〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉),
|φ4〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
(7)
4For arbitrary hidden variable λ0 = i and λ1 = j, upper bound of the phase error rate e
i,j
phase can be estimated by
applying the bit error rate ei,jbit and the randomness deviation parameters,
e
i,j
phase − ei,jbit
=
(1
2
−
√
−(p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i)− 1
2
)2 +
1
4
)
q00
−
(1
2
−
√
−(p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i)− 1
2
)2 +
1
4
)
q11
+
(
2p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j)− 1
)(1
2
+
√
−(p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i)− 1
2
)2 +
1
4
)
q01
−
(
2p(x1 = 0|λ1 = j)− 1
)(1
2
+
√
−(p(x0 = 0|λ0 = i)− 1
2
)2 +
1
4
)
q10
≤
(1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
)
q00 +
(1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
)
q11 + 2ǫ1q01 + 2ǫ1q10
≤ max
((1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
)
, 2ǫ1
)
≡ δ,
(8)
where we apply q00 + q11 ≤ 1, q01 + q10 ≤ 1 and
∑
u,v qu,v = 1 in the previous calculation. By applying the EDP
technology, the final secret key rate with given hidden variables λ0 = i and λ1 = j is
Ri,j ≥ 1− h(ei,jphase)− h(ei,jbit) ≥ 1− h(ei,jbit + δ)− h(ei,jbit). (9)
In the practical experimental realization, we can only observe the practical quantum bit error rate ebit =∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
bit, the final secret key rate with given quantum bit error rate ebit can be given by
R ≥∑i,j pλ0=ipλ1=jRi,j
≥∑i,j pλ0=ipλ1=j
(
1− h(ei,jphase)− h(ei,jbit)
)
≥∑i,j pλ0=ipλ1=j
(
1− h(ei,jbit + δ)− h(ei,jbit)
)
≥ 1− h
(∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
bit + δ
)
− h
(∑
i,j pλ0=ipλ1=je
i,j
bit
)
= 1− h(ebit + δ)− h(ebit),
(10)
where we apply the concavity property of the Shannon entropy function in the previous calculation. By implementing
the security analysis result, we calculate the secret key rate R with given randomness deviation parameters ǫ0 and ǫ1
in Fig. 2. The calculation result demonstrates that the bases selection weak randomness decrease the final secret key
rate more obviously comparing with the classical bit encoding weak randomness.
Two-step post processing method - In the previous weak randomness model, the input random numbers
maybe controlled by the hidden variables λ0 and λ1. Since there are two different bases selection (diagonal basis and
rectilinear basis) and two different classical bit encoding (0 and 1), we can simply assume λ0 and λ1 have two different
values {0, 1} respectively.
In the practical experimental realization, we can only observe the classical bit encoding probability p(x0) =
pλ0=0p(x0|λ0 = 0) + pλ0=1p(x0|λ0 = 1), but p(x0) =
1
2
can’t guarantee p(x0|λ0 = 0) = p(x0|λ0 = 1) = 1
2
, the
detailed classical bit deviation model is given in Fig. 3. Similarly, we can also only observe the bases selection
probability p(x1) = pλ1=0p(x1|λ1 = 0) + pλ1=1p(x1|λ1 = 1), but the observed probability p(x1) =
1
2
can’t guarantee
p(x1|λ1 = 0) = p(x1|λ1 = 1) = 1
2
, the detailed bases selection deviation model is given in Fig. 4. The practical
quantum state preparation is given by
ρAB =
∑
λ1
pλ1p(x1 = 0|λ1)
∑
λ0
pλ0ρABZλ0 +
∑
λ1
pλ1p(x1 = 1|λ1)
∑
λ0
pλ0ρABXλ0 , (11)
where
ρABZλ0 =
∑
u,v qu,vI ⊗XuZv|ϕ〉〈ϕ|λ0ZvXu ⊗ I,
ρABXλ0 =
∑
u,v qu,vI ⊗HXuZvH |ϕ〉〈ϕ|λ0HZvXuH ⊗ I.
(12)
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate with different quantum bit error rate value, where the blue solid line is no randomness deviation case,
the green dash line is considering ǫ0 = 0.1 and ǫ1 = 0, the red dotted line is considering ǫ0 = 0 and ǫ1 = 0.1 with two-step
post processing method, the red dash dotted line is considering ǫ0 = 0 and ǫ1 = 0.1 with one-step post processing method.
Comparing with the one-step post processing method, two-step post processing method can generate much more secret key
with given basis selection randomness deviation, this is because we can get more precious phase error estimation in the two-step
post processing method.
FIG. 3: The classical bit encoding x0 is controlled by the hidden variable λ0, different λ0 values have different classical bit
encoding probability p(x0|λ0).
For given hidden variables λ0 and λ1, the difference between the phase error rate in the rectilinear basis and bit error
rate in the diagonal basis can be given by
|epλ0λ10 − ebλ0λ11| ≤
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
. (13)
where epλ0λ10 = 〈φ3|ρABZλ0 |φ3〉 + 〈φ4|ρABZλ0 |φ4〉, ebλ0λ11 = 〈φ2|ρABXλ0 |φ2〉 + 〈φ4|ρABXλ0 |φ4〉. Similarly, The dif-
ference between the phase error rate in the diagonal basis and bit error rate in the rectilinear basis can be given
by
|epλ0λ11 − ebλ0λ10| ≤
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
, (14)
where epλ0λ11 = 〈φ3|ρABXλ0 |φ3〉 + 〈φ4|ρABXλ0 |φ4〉, ebλ0λ10 = 〈φ2|ρABZλ0 |φ2〉 + 〈φ4|ρABZλ0 |φ4〉. By considering
epλ10 = 〈φ3|
∑
λ0
pλ0ρABZλ0 |φ3〉 + 〈φ4|
∑
λ0
pλ0ρABZλ0 |φ4〉 =
∑
λ0
pλ0epλ0λ10 and ebλ11 = 〈φ2|
∑
λ0
pλ0ρABXλ0 |φ2〉 +
6FIG. 4: The basis selection deviation is controlled by the hidden variable λ1, different λ1 value has different basis selection
probability p(x1|λ1). For given hidden variable λ1 = 0, eb00 and eb01 are bit error rates introduced in the rectilinear basis and
diagonal basis, while ep00 and ep01 are phase error rates introduced in the rectilinear basis and diagonal basis respectively. For
given hidden variable λ1 = 1, eb10 and eb11 are bit error rates introduced in the rectilinear basis and diagonal basis, while ep10
and ep11 are phase error rates introduced in the rectilinear basis and diagonal basis respectively.
〈φ4|
∑
λ0
pλ0ρABXλ0 |φ4〉 =
∑
λ0
pλ0ebλ0λ11, we calculate the difference between the phase error rate epλ10 and the bit
error rate ebλ11
|epλ10 − ebλ11| =
∣∣∑
λ0
pλ0
(
epλ0λ10 − ebλ0λ11
)∣∣
≤∑λ0 pλ0
∣∣epλ0λ10 − ebλ0λ11∣∣
≤∑λ0 pλ0
(1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
)
=
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
.
(15)
Similarly, the difference between epλ11 and ebλ10 is
|epλ11 − ebλ10| ≤
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
. (16)
The probability of getting the rectilinear basis and diagonal basis measurement outcomes in Bob’s side can be
respectively given by
prec = prec1 + prec2, pdia = pdia1 + pdia2, (17)
where prec1 = pλ1=0p(x1 = 0|λ1 = 0), prec2 = pλ1=1p(x1 = 0|λ1 = 1), pdia1 = pλ1=0p(x1 = 1|λ1 = 0), pdia2 =
pλ1=1p(x1 = 1|λ1 = 1). The phase error rate in the rectilinear basis and diagonal basis can be respectively given by
erecpha =
prec1ep00 + prec2ep10
prec
≤ prec1eb01 + prec2eb11
prec
+
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
,
ediapha =
pdia1ep01 + pdia2ep11
pdia
≤ pdia1eb00 + pdia2eb10
pdia
+
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
.
(18)
The bit error rate in the rectilinear basis and diagonal basis can be respectively given by
erecbit =
prec1eb00 + prec2eb10
prec
, ediabit =
pdia1eb01 + pdia2eb11
pdia
. (19)
By applying the two-step post processing method with the two different bases measurement outcomes, the final secret
key rate can be given by
R ≥ prec
(
1− h(erecbit)− h(erecpha)
)
+ pdia
(
1− h(ediabit)− h(ediapha)
)
, (20)
7where the first part is the secret key generated by the rectilinear basis, while the second part is the secret key generated
by the diagonal basis. The corresponding secret key rate R with different quantum bit error rate values is given in
Fig. 2, the calculation is based on the nonlinear optimization method with given quantum bit error rate, the detailed
explanation is in the methods. To explain our analysis result, we compare the two analysis methods by considering
the wavelength attack has the coupling ratio 0.4 and 0.6 with different wavelengths. If the observed quantum bit
error rate is 0.02, one-step post processing method can generate the secret key rate 0.0984, while the two-step post
processing method can generate the secret key rate 0.6642.
Methods- By considering Eve’s arbitrary attacking scheme, the final secret key rate with two different bases can
be calculated with the following optimization method
Minimize : prec
(
1− h(erecbit)− h(erecpha)
)
+ pdia
(
1− h(ediabit)− h(ediapha)
)
Subject to : pλ0=0 + pλ0=1 = pλ1=0 + pλ1=1 = 1
p(x0 = 0|λ0) + p(x0 = 1|λ0) = p(x1 = 0|λ1) + p(x1 = 1|λ1) = 1
0 ≤ eb00, eb01, eb10, eb11, pλ0=0, pλ1=0 ≤ 1
|p(x0|λ0 = i)− 1
2
| ≤ ε0
|p(x1|λ1 = j)− 1
2
| ≤ ε1
|epλ10 − ebλ11| ≤
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
|epλ11 − ebλ10| ≤
1
2
−
√
−ǫ2
0
+
1
4
prec = pdia =
1
2
precerecbit + pdiaediabit = Q,
(21)
where Q is the quantum bit error rate estimated in the practical experimental realization, prec = pdia =
1
2
are the
bases selection probability observed in the practical experimental realization.
Conclusion - In this work, security of BB84 QKD protocol again the strong randomness attack and the weak
randomness attack have been analyzed, which satisfies several practical attacking schemes, such as the photon number
splitting attack, detector blinding attack, wavelength attack and time shift attack. We demonstrate that security of
the practical QKD system can be evaluated by respectively considering the Trojan horse attack, the strong randomness
attack and the weak randomness attack, and the three attacking models can be employed to build the practical QKD
system security standardization in the future.
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